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Abstract
Background. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) is invoked frequently when 
social science scholars examine messages, affect, cognition, and action. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the TRA is a cross-sectional model limits its 
utility as an explanatory mechanism for those who study relationships among 
these variables as they change over time. This essay addresses this limitation 
by developing three versions of a Dynamic Theory of Reasoned Action 
(DTRA).
Method. Simulations were conducted to examine the properties of these varying 
DTRA models. The extent of autoregression was varied in these simulations, 
and the subsequent effects on the size and stability of the model parameters, 
the fit of the cross-sectional TRA, and the distributional properties of the 
variables that comprise the model were assessed.
Results. Results indicate that in the absence of an external shock (such as a 
persuasive message), these models reach equilibrium, and that trials 
to equilibrium increase as the autoregression parameters increase. The 
TRA fits perfectly at equilibrium, but may fail when the system is not in 
equilibrium, even when the DTRA fits perfectly. Finally, although starting with 
seed distributions closely approximating normality, distributional properties 
depart decidedly from normality over trials.
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Conclusion. Implications for the fit of cross-sectional causal models and the 
meaning of cross-sectional associations are discussed.
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Building on Dulany’s (1968) work on propositional control, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
developed the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA). Subsequently, the TRA has proved 
to be an influential description of the underlying processes that determine intentional 
behavior (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988; Trafimow, 1998). By clarifying dis-
tinctions among the four major components of the theory—normative social pressure 
(the subjective norm), affect (attitude toward the behavior), cognition (behavioral 
intention), and action (behavior)—this approach to predicting, explaining, and under-
standing action is more sophisticated and defensible than its predecessors, and has 
served as the yardstick by which all theorizing on the subject is measured (Pavitt, 
2001). Scholars from diverse academic disciplines have employed the TRA (e.g., 
Weber, Martin, & Corrigan, 2007) to predict and explain behavior ranging from church 
attendance (e.g., Brinberg, 1979) to contraceptive usage (e.g., McCarty, 1981). Despite 
its frequent invocation as an explanatory mechanism of diverse phenomena (e.g., 
Romano & Netland, 2008), the TRA is not without its critics (Liska, 1984; Ogden, 
2003; Ouellette & Wood, 1998).
In the spirit of extending the TRA, addressing some of the critiques of the model, 
and examining its implications, this manuscript has two goals. The first is to extend the 
model by developing dynamic versions of it (DTRA). In the process, responses to 
critiques of the TRA will be offered. The second is to develop the implications of a 
DTRA for cross-sectional tests of the TRA. To these ends, a brief description of the 
TRA is provided, and corresponding dynamic versions are developed. Finally, simula-
tion results are presented to demonstrate how dynamic processes can affect cross-
sectional tests of fit of the TRA.1
The TRA
As Figure 1 illustrates, the TRA can be viewed as a cross-sectional causal model posit-
ing that volitional behavior (B) is a function of behavioral intention (I), with I con-
ceived as the subjective probability that an action will be performed (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975). As the sole determinant of B in the model, I is hypothesized to mediate com-
pletely the influence of attitude toward the behavior (A) and subjective norm (N) on B. 
As Figure 1 indicates, A and N are the only predictors of I, with A typically exhibiting 
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stronger influence on I than does N (Armitage & Connor, 2001; O’Keefe, 2002). 
Conceptually, A “represents a person’s general favorableness or unfavorableness toward 
some stimulus object” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 216), the stimulus object being a 
specific B. In contrast, N is defined as “the person’s perception that most people who 
are important to him think that he should or should not perform the behavior in ques-
tion” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 302). Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) equation specifies 
the TRA’s main tenets, B I A W N W∼ = +( ) ( )1 2 , with W1  and W2  being empirically 
determined weights. The regression of B onto I is presumed to be linear, and the regres-
sion of I onto A and N is presumed to be both linear and additive.
The model presented in Figure 1 allows a spurious association between A and N, 
and generally, these constructs covary positively. Presumably, this positive covariation 
arises from causal forces antecedent to the model. For example, the existence of a 
common cause(s) that correlates either positively with both variables or negatively 
with both variables can produce such positive covariation.
For this model to fit a set of data, two general conditions must be met. First, the 
three direct effect parameters in Figure 1, α, β, and γ, must be ample because for one 
variable to be considered a direct cause of another requires substantial covariation 
between them, or, in the case of α and β, substantial covariation after controlling for 
the effect of another posited cause. Second, the obtained values of the correlations 
unconstrained by estimation must not deviate substantially from their predicted val-
ues. Both the correlations between A and B and between N and B are unconstrained by 
estimation. Causal analysis indicates that the structure of this model predicts that
r rAB AN= + ( )αγ βγ
and
r rNB AN= + ( )βγ αγ.
Furthermore, when ordinary least squares (OLS) is employed to estimate the mod-








Figure 1. The Theory of Reasoned Action.




















γ = rIB .
Substituting these parameter values into the preceding expressions for rAB and rNB 
yields the more elegant expressions,
r r rAB AI IB=
and
r r rNB NI IB= ,
for the predicted correlations, rAB and rNB.
The DTRA
The theoretical mechanisms by which the components of the TRA change, however, 
have not been elucidated. This lacuna is critical for theory, because the causal links in 
cross-sectional models arise from change processes.2 A DTRA can be developed by 
considering the manner in which each of the four variables in the TRA change.3 Cases 
in which there is an absence of an exogenous shock were examined. Because both A 
and N are posited to be exogenous, in the absence of any force designed to change 





By the definition of the change operator, it follows that
N N Nt t =  = 1 0−
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and
A A At t =  = 1 0− .
Hence, this model asserts that in the absence of a shock, such as an effective per-
suasive message, both A and N exhibit perfect first-order autoregression.
I, however, is endogenous in the TRA, its direct causes being both A and N. All 
three of these variables can be scaled on a continuum that ranges from extremely posi-
tive to extremely negative, so that it is sensible to speak of persons comparing them. 
This DTRA model posits that I changes when persons compare I with A and N, and 
adjusts I to reduce discrepancies. Converting this verbal proposition to a difference 
equation yields,
∆ Φ ΨI N I A I= − + −( ) ( ),
where 0 < Φ ≤ 1 and 0 < Ψ ≤ 1.
This equation implies that when A is more positive than I, then I will change in the 
direction of becoming more positive; whereas when A is more negative than I, then I 
will change in the direction of becoming more negative. Furthermore, when N is more 
positive than I, then change in I will be positive; whereas when N is more negative 
than I, then change in I will be negative.
The symbols Φ and Ψ represent the relative impact of A and N on I. The restriction 
on the values that the parameters Φ and Ψ may take indicate important features of how 
these variables affect I. Such restrictions are that I changes in the direction of A (N), so 
that no boomerang occurs (i.e., 0 < Φ and 0 < Ψ), and that this change does not become 
more extreme than A (N), so that no overshoot occurs (i.e., Φ ≤ 1 and Ψ ≤ 1).
Given a two-wave panel study, Equation 1 can be written in recursive form as,
It t t t+ = + +1 Φ Ψ ΩN A I ,
where Ω = 1 − Φ − Ψ,
and in which the subscripts refer to time, zero representing the initial measurement 
and one representing the subsequent measurement. The recursive equation has the 
intuitively appealing feature of predicting that I, at any given time, is determined com-
pletely by the immediately preceding (temporally) linear combination of A, N, and the 
previous I. As with A and N, I exhibits first-order autoregression. Because the model 
posits multiple causes of I, however, I does not exhibit perfect positive first-order 
autocorrelation.
The TRA also asserts that B is endogenous, I being its sole antecedent. This DTRA 
model claims that B is changed when persons compare their B with their I and adjust 
B proportionally to reduce any discrepancy between the two. Converting this verbal 
proposition to a difference equation yields,
∆ ΛB I B= −( ),
(1)
(2)
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where 0 < Λ ≤ 1.
Equation 2 implies that when I is more positive than B, then change in B will be 
positive; whereas when I is more negative than B, then change in B will be negative. 
The proportionality constant, Λ, measures the proportion of the I − B discrepancy that 
is reduced. Again, the restrictions on the values that the parameter can assume reflect 
the theoretical proposition that boomerang and overshoot do not occur.
Writing Equation 2 in recursive form yields,
B I Bt t t+ = +1   Λ Π ,
where Π = 1 − Λ.
This recursive form has the feature of predicting that B, at any given time, is deter-
mined completely by the immediately preceding (temporally) linear combination of I 
and B. B exhibits positive first-order autoregression, but because the model posits 
multiple causes, B is not expected to exhibit perfect positive first-order autocorrela-
tion. Notably, to the extent that Ouellette and Wood’s (1998) claim that habit needs to 
be included in causal models of B is accurate, this effect is incorporated in this dynamic 
version of the TRA by the parameter Π. Consistent with this position, Webb and 
Sheeran’s (2006) meta-analysis of intention and behavior found that I has a smaller 
effect on B when habits are likely to be strong.
The recursive forms of these equations can be generalized and combined to pro-
duce the longitudinal causal model presented in Figure 2. The change equations pro-
vide the theoretical basis of this model, and Figure 2 follows logically from them. 
Measurements of A, N, I, and B taken at multiple times can be used to test this model, 
and by extension, the theory summarized in the change equations.
Because in the absence of a shock, such as a persuasive message, there is no reason 
to expect A or N to change, these variables are in equilibrium. The equilibrium predic-
tion for I can be obtained by setting the change equation for I equal to zero and solving. 




















Therefore, the model has the intuitive appealing property that at equilibrium, I 
becomes a weighted sum of one’s A and N, such that the stronger the impact of the 
A − I discrepancy (i.e., Ψ) relative to the impact of the N − I discrepancy (i.e., Φ), the 
more heavily weighted is A in determining I. Conversely, the stronger the impact of the 
N − I discrepancy (i.e., Φ) relative to the impact of the A − I discrepancy (i.e., Ψ), the 
more heavily weighted is N in determining I.
The equilibrium prediction for B can be obtained by setting the change equation for 
B to zero and solving. This procedure yields the solution, B = I. Hence, at equilibrium, 
B becomes completely consistent, and hence correlated perfectly, with I.
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A simulation was conducted to examine the implications of the DTRA for cross-
sectional tests of the TRA. In addition to examining the fit of the cross-sectional TRA 
at each time point, the time necessary to reach equilibrium was examined.
Given the focus of this article on the fit of the cross-sectional TRA, it is valuable to 
scrutinize time to reach equilibrium as it is expected that, in the absence of an external 
shock, as the DTRA approaches equilibrium, the fit of the cross-sectional TRA will 
improve (Kaplan, Harik, & Hotchkiss, 2001). In addition, when the DTRA reaches 
equilibrium, it is expected that, in the absence of an external shock, it will stay in equi-
librium; that is, it will be a stable equilibrium. At that point, the cross-sectional TRA is 
expected to exhibit perfect fit. Thus, the sooner the DTRA reaches equilibrium, the 
sooner will the cross-sectional TRA model begin to fit the data perfectly.
The time to reach equilibrium is expected to be a function of the strength of autore-
gression such that the stronger the autoregression parameters (i.e., Ω and Π) relative to 
the cross-lag parameters (i.e., Φ, Ψ, and Λ), the less time required to reach equilibrium. 
As the change equations for A and N indicate, in the absence of change, autoregression 
is perfect. Although strong, and even perfect, autoregression can result when a vari-
able is changing, less than perfect autoregression implies that change must be occur-
ring. In addition, generally, the lower the autoregression coefficients, the more change 
would be occurring. Ceteris paribus, the more change, the longer will a system take to 
reach equilibrium. Consequently, it is expected that varying the autoregression coef-
ficients will vary the time taken for the system to reach equilibrium, which will, in 
turn, determine the time taken for the cross-sectional TRA to fit perfectly.
To examine this notion, Ω and Π were varied. The details of a simulation designed 


















Figure 2. The longitudinal causal model produced by the Dynamic Theory of Reasoned 
Action.
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Forward Simulation
Method
Seed distribution. Initial distributions of each of the four key components of the TRA 
(A, N, I, and B) were constructed. Several criteria were employed when developing 
these distributions. First, a large sample, but not unreasonably large by social science 
standards, was deemed desirable. Second, the range of each variable was to be bounded 
in a manner found commonly in social science research. Third, uniformity in central 
tendency and dispersion for each variable was sought to simplify both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal comparisons. Fourth, a familiar and uniform (across variables) distri-
bution shape was judged useful for comparison purposes. Pursuant to these goals, the 
distribution of each variable was composed of 1,600 hypothetical cases, scores ranged 
from 1 to 5 for each variable with a mean of 3.0, a standard deviation of 1.0, and the 
distribution was approximately normal with no skewness, but slight platykurtosis 
(−.498, se = .122).
These initial distributions were also created, so that the regression of B on I was 
linear, the regression of I on both A and N was linear, and the correlations among these 
four variables fit the cross-sectional TRA within sampling error. The initial correlation 
matrix is presented in Table 1, and testing the fit of the cross-sectional causal model 
with Hamilton and Hunter’s (1995) algorithm produced ample and reasonable param-
eter estimates for all postulated causal paths (see Table 2) and excellent fit, χ2(2, N = 
1,600) = 1.37, p = .50, RMSE = .03.
Design. To simulate the change in the components of the TRA, it was necessary to 
specify reasonable values for the parameters. To assess the impact of differences in the 
parameters on the fit of the cross-sectional TRA, the autoregression parameters were 
varied and the cross-lag parameters were adjusted to meet the constraints specified in 
the change equations and their recursive forms. Table 2 presents the parameter values 
for the weak, moderate, and strong autoregression conditions.
Notably, in each condition, the autoregression parameters are larger than the 
cross-lag parameters, so that cognitive and behavioral inertia are deemed stronger 
Table 1. Correlations Among Seed Distribution Variables and Initial Parameter Estimates.
Attitude Norm Intent Behavior
Attitude  
Norm .25  
Intent .56 .31  
Behavior .25 .13 .50  
p(IA) .52  
P(IN) .18  
p(BI) .50  
RI.AN .59  
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causal forces than the impact of exogenous variables or the mediating variable. 
Moreover, in each condition, the A component is set so that it is stronger than the N 
component so as to comport with the empirical evidence (Armitage & Connor, 2001; 
O’Keefe, 2002).
Procedure. The recursive equations were employed to generate values for each of the 
four variables in the system over time. The iterative process was terminated when vari-
able specific criteria for equilibrium or stability were reached.
Instrumentation. The number of iterations (trials) required for the system to reach equi-
librium was assessed by examining the mean and the variance in the change in I and 
B. The impact of the change processes on the fit of cross-sectional tests of the TRA 
Table 2. Summary of the Parameters.
DTRA Weak Moderate Strong
Φ .20 .15 .10
Ψ .35 .25 .15
Ω .45 .60 .75
Λ .40 .25 .10
Π .60 .75 .90
DRTRA Weak Moderate Strong
λ .60 .75 .90
Γ .40 .25 .10
ζ .60 .75 .90
Ξ .40 .25 .10
Θ .60 .75 .90
π .40 .25 .10
DNTRA Weak Moderate Strong
α .40 .25 .10
δ .60 .75 .90
β .40 .25 .10
ε .60 .75 .90
τ .18 .14 .08
µ .18 .14 .08
ϕ .18 .14 .08
κ .46 .58 .76
γ .40 .25 .10
ρ .60 .75 .90
Note. DTRA = Dynamic Theory of Reasoned Action; DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of 
Reasoned Action; DRTRA = Dynamic Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action.
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was assessed by examining three features of these models. First, the effect on the size 
and stability of the parameters was estimated. Second, the effect on model fit was 
examined. Third, the effect on the distributional properties of the variables that com-
pose the model was assessed.
Results
A criterion of both the mean and the standard deviation in the change in I equaling zero 
to two decimal places (i.e., MΔI = SΔI < .005) for five consecutive trials was used to 
define equilibrium in I. From Table 3, it may be observed that the number of trials to 
reach this criterion increased as autoregression increased. The same criterion was 
employed to define the equilibrium in B (i.e., both MΔB < .005 and SΔB < .005 must be 
reached). Again, the number of trials to reach equilibrium increased as autoregression 
increased (see Table 3).4
From these observations, several conclusions may be drawn. First, as a result of 
being at the end of the causal process, B took longer to reach equilibrium (across 
autoregression conditions, M = 21.33 trials) than the mediator I (across autoregression 
conditions, M = 10.67 trials). The difference was more pronounced when autoregres-
sion was strong (a difference of 19 trials) than when it was moderate (a difference of 8 
trials) than when it was weak (a difference of 5 trials). Second, the effect of the mag-
nitude of autoregression on trials to criterion was more pronounced for B than for I. 
Specifically, the difference in trials to criterion between the moderate and weak 
Table 3. Trials to Reach Equilibrium as a Function of Strength of Autoregression.
DTRA Weak Moderate Strong M
S(ΔI) 7 10 15 10.67
S(ΔB) 12 18 34 21.33
M 9.5 14 24.5  
DRTRA Weak Moderate Strong M
S(ΔA) 14 22 45 27
S(ΔN) 14 22 45 27
S(ΔI) 10 15 30 18.34
M 12.67 19.667 40  
DNTRA Weak Moderate Strong M
S(ΔA) 10 14 27 17
S(ΔN) 10 14 28 17.33
S(ΔI) 3 5 10 6
S(ΔB) 10 14 27 17
M 8.25 11.75 23  
Note. DTRA = Dynamic Theory of Reasoned Action; DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of 
Reasoned Action; DRTRA = Dynamic Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action.
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autoregression conditions was 3 trials for I, but 6 trials for B. The difference between 
the strong and moderate autoregression conditions was 5 trials for I, but 16 trials for B.
Third, the rapidity of the descent to equilibrium varied as a function of the strength 
of autoregression. Figure 3 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal 
places, in the change in I as a function of trials (time). In all conditions, the standard 
deviation in the change in I decreased exponentially as a function of time. Notably, 
although the DTRA with the low autoregression parameters reach equilibrium faster 
than the DTRA with high autoregression parameters, the latter never deviated substan-
tially from equilibrium. In fact, their deviations from equilibrium are smaller for most 
trials than are the deviations produced by the DTRA with moderate or small autore-
gression parameters.
Figure 4 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal places, in the 
change in B as a function of time. As with I, in all conditions, the standard deviation in 
the change in B decreased exponentially as a function of time. In addition, as with I, 
although the DTRA with low autoregression parameters reached equilibrium faster 
than the DTRA with high autoregression parameters, the latter never deviated substan-
tially from equilibrium, and their deviations from equilibrium are smaller for most 
trials than are the deviations produced by the DTRA with moderate or small autore-
gression parameters.
The features of the cross-sectional model that was examined included various 
descriptive statistics (e.g., the variance in I and the variance in B5), parameter esti-
mates (the path coefficients and the multiple correlation of I with A and N), and mea-
sures of model fit (chi-square and the root mean squared error). Each will be considered 
in turn.
Figure 3. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in I as a function of the time 
and the strength of autoregression for the DTRA.
Note. DTRA = Dynamic Theory of Reasoned Action.
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As Table 4 indicates, the values of the variances in I and B at equilibrium varied 
little as a function of the strength of autoregression, stabilizing in the mid .6 range. The 
number of trials required to reach these stable values did, however, vary substantially 
for the two variables and as a function of the strength of autoregression. Moreover, 
these relationships parallel those found for the variance in the change in I and the vari-
ance in the change in B. Specifically, the variance in I stabilized more rapidly (across 
autoregression conditions, M = 9.67 trials) than the variance in B (across autoregres-
sion conditions, M = 24.33 trials), trials to stabilize increased more than proportionally 
as the strength of autoregression increased (M = 8.0, 15.0, and 28.0 for weak, moder-
ate, and strong autoregression, respectively), and the difference in trials to stabilize 
increased more rapidly for B than for I.
Data pertinent to the four cross-sectional parameters obtained after the system 
reached equilibrium are presented in Table 5. These parameters were estimated in this 
and all subsequent simulations using the ordinary least squares criterion. Specifically, 
p(IA) is obtained by regressing I on A, controlling for N; P(IN) is obtained by regres-
sion I on N, controlling for A; and p(BI) is obtained by regressing B on I. From this 
table, one may observe that the path linking A and I (pIA) stabilized in the middle to 
upper .7 range, the path linking N and I (pIN) being substantially lower stabilized in the 
mid .4 to .5 range, the path linking I and B (pBI) stabilized at 1.00, and the multiple 
correlation of I with A and N (RI.AN) stabilized at 1.00. Notably, the latter two param-
eters indicate that the endogenous variables are predicted without error to two decimal 
points when the model reaches an equilibrium state. Also notable is that the point at 
which the pIA estimate stabilized decreased slightly with increasing autoregression, 
whereas the point at which the pIN estimate stabilized increased slightly with increas-
ing autoregression. For each of the parameter estimates, the number of trials taken to 
Figure 4. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in B as a function of the time 
and the strength of autoregression for the DTRA.
Note. DTRA = Dynamic Theory of Reasoned Action.
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reach stability increased with increasing autoregression, albeit not proportionally, the 
trend for the pBI estimate being particularly pronounced.
The root mean squared error (RMSE) was employed as a measure of the fit of the 
cross-sectional model. Perfect fit was defined as occurring when the RMSE reduced to 
zero rounded to two decimal places. The number of trials to reach zero increased with 
increasing autoregression with 10 trials being required when autoregression was weak, 
13 trials when autoregression was moderate, and 30 trials when autoregression was 
strong.6
Discussion
Strong autoregression in I and B suggests strong cognitive inertia, in the case of I, and 
powerful habit strength, or behavioral inertia, in the case of B. Although in the strong 
autoregression condition, the model began closer to equilibrium and approximated it 
closely over trials, contrary to expectations increasing autoregression resulted in the 
four variable system reaching equilibrium less rapidly. The strong I autoregression 
parameter implied a weaker effect of A and N on I, and the strong B autoregression 
parameter implied a weaker effect of I on B. Combined, these forces slowed the rate of 
change in the endogenous variables that was necessary to reach equilibrium.
Table 4. Values of the Variance in the Endogenous Variables at Equilibrium (Trials to 
Stabilize) as a Function of Strength of Autoregression.
DTRA Weak Moderate Strong M
V(I) .65 (5) .65 (9) .64 (15) 9.67
V(B) .65 (11) .65 (21) .63 (41) 24.33
M 8 15 28  
DRTRA Weak Moderate Strong M
V(A) 1 (15) 1 (26) .99 (59) 33.33
V(N) 1 (15) 1 (26) .99 (59) 33.33
V(I) 1 (10) 1 (18)    1 (50) 26
M 13.33 23.33 56  
DNTRA Weak Moderate Strong M
V(A) .56 (12) .54 (12) .52 (23) 0.54
V(N) .56 (3) .54 (5) .51 (15) 0.54
V(I) .56 (2) .54 (4) .52 (12) 0.54
V(B) .56 (9) .54 (9) .51 (28) 0.54
M 0.56 0.54 0.52  
Note. DTRA = Dynamic Theory of Reasoned Action; DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of 
Reasoned Action; DRTRA = Dynamic Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action.
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A second implication of the model is that convergence is more rapid for proximal 
variables in the causal sequence. Put differently, in this simulation, I reached equilib-
rium more rapidly than did B, this effect being more pronounced with increasing 
autoregression.
To anticipate one objection, a question may be raised as to why model the TRA 
longitudinally rather than the TPB with its more extensive variable set. One reason is 
that it is useful to begin to understand the simpler model before proceeding to the more 
complex model. Another answer, however, is that perhaps the list of variables in the 
TPB may be reducible. Habit (Ouellette & Wood, 1998), for example, may be reduced 
to the autoregression parameter linking B with itself at a previous point in time. 
Efficacy, or perceived behavioral control, may be modeled by reversing the TRA (i.e., 
perhaps when B is less under one’s control, B drives I which, in turn, drives both A and 
N). Although much social scientific theory is often linked with variable proliferation, 
in some other disciplines, an important function of theory is variable reduction as well. 
Perhaps some variables are created by some social scientists as a substitute for longi-
tudinal parameters or differing longitudinal models. This possibility is explored in a 
second simulation.
Table 5. Values of Parameter Estimates at Equilibrium (Trials to Stabilize) as a Function of 
Strength of Autoregression.
DTRA Weak Moderate Strong
p(IA) .79 (3) .78 (4) .75 (11)
p(IN) .45 (5) .47 (12) .50 (12)
p(BI) 1.00 (7) 1.00 (11) 1.00 (27)
RI.AN 1.00 (3) 1.00 (5) 1.00 (9)
DRTRA Weak Moderate Strong
p(IB) 1.00 (5) 1.00 (8) 1.00 (21)
p(AI) 1.00 (8) 1.00 (13) 1.00 (33)
p(NI) 1.00 (8) 1.00 (13) 1.00 (33)
DNTRA Weak Moderate Strong
p(IA) .50 (5) .50 (5) .50 (5)
p(IN) .50 (5) .50 (5) .50 (5)
p(BI) 1.00 (5) 1.00 (11) 1.00 (29)
p(IB) 1.00 (5) 1.00 (10) 1.00 (29)
p(AI) 1.00 (5) 1.00 (10) 1.00 (29)
p(NI) 1.00 (5) 1.00 (10) 1.00 (29)
Note. DTRA = Dynamic Theory of Reasoned Action; DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of 
Reasoned Action; DRTRA = Dynamic Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action.
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Reverse Simulation
The cross-sectional reversed model (RTRA) is presented in Figure 5. This model 
includes three correlations (or covariances) that are unconstrained by estimation, the 
A-B, N-B, and A-N correlations. Although it appears not to be well known, and although 
it is counterintuitive, both the TRA and RTRA make exactly the same predictions as to 
the value of the A-B and N-B correlations (see the appendix). In addition, the RTRA 
predicts that the A-N correlation is the product of the A-I and N-I correlations, that is, 
rAN = (rAI) × (rNI).
The conceptual value of the RTRA may be as an explanatory mechanism of invol-
untary behavior. Specifically, if persons were to believe that an action was not control-
lable for them (i.e., low perceived behavioral control), then it is reasonable to posit that 
their subjective probability estimate of what they will do (i.e., their intention) is driven 
by present action. That is, if particular action is deemed uncontrollable, then one is 
likely to conclude that one will engage in it (or fail to). Such fatalism would result in 
such persons noting that they intend to continue their present course of action, as they 
would have no ability to do otherwise. These intentions would, in term, shape subse-
quent attitudes that are formed about the behavior and perceptions of the normative 
beliefs of significant others (or indeed, it may shape those judged to be significant 
others) toward the behavior.
This process may also explain the substantial amount of behavioral inertia observed 
in particular domains of action. For example, if one were to think of smoking as behav-
ior over which volitional control is low, then it may be more useful to predict future 
behavior from current behavior, thus employing the RTRA for explanatory and predic-
tive power. Given that many smokers are addicted to nicotine, current smoking behav-
ior would be predictable from prior smoking. In addition, behavioral intentions would 
be predictable from knowing prior behavior. It is instructive on this point to note that 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) grant that some research demonstrates that prior behavior 
has an effect on behavioral intentions and that their theory fails to explain this link. 
Finally, consistent with cognitive dissonance theory and self-perception theory, these 
intentions would shape subsequent attitudes that are formed about smoking and per-









Figure 5. The Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action.
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A longitudinal version of this model, the DRTRA, is presented in Figure 6. Given 
that B is exogenous in the model, in the absences of a shock (e.g., a persuasive mes-
sage) designed to change it, no change is expected to exist. Thus,
∆B = 0
and
B B Bt t    = =−1 0.
Hence, this model asserts that in the absence of a shock, B exhibits perfect first-
order autoregression.
I, on the other hand, is endogenous in the RTRA, its direct cause being B, and this 
DRTRA model posits that I may change when persons compare I and B, adjusting I 
proportionally to reduce any discrepancies. It follows that
∆ ΓI B I= −( ),
where 0 < Γ ≤ 1.
This equation implies that when B is greater than I, then I will increase; whereas 
when B is less than I, then I will decrease.
Γ represents the relative impact of B on I. The restriction on the values that Γ may 
take indicates that I changes in the direction of B, so that no boomerang or overshoot 
occur. Writing the equation in recursive form yields,
I B KIt t t+ = +1 Γ   ,
where K = 1 − Γ.
This equation predicts that I at any given time is determined completely by the 

















Figure 6. The longitudinal causal model produced by the Dynamic Reverse Theory of 
Reasoned Action.
(3)
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posits that I exhibits first-order autoregression. Because the model posits that I is 
caused by B as well, I is not, however, expected to exhibit perfect positive first-order 
autocorrelation.
The RTRA also asserts that both A and N are endogenous, I being the sole anteced-
ent of each. This DRTRA model claims that A is changed when persons compare A and 
I, adjusting A proportionally to reduce discrepancies. This same comparison process 
occurs for N as well; persons compare N with I adjusting N proportionally to reduce 
discrepancies. Formally,
∆A H I A= −( ),
where 0 < H ≤ 1,
and
∆ ΘN I N= −( ),
where 0 < Θ ≤ 1.
Equation 4 implies that when I is greater than A, then A will increase; whereas when 
I is less than A, then A will decrease. The proportionality constant, ζ, measures the 
proportion of the I-A discrepancy that is reduced. Equation 5 implies that when I is 
greater than N, then change in N is positive; whereas when I is less than N, then change 
in N is negative. The parameter, Θ, measures the proportion of the I-N discrepancy that 
is reduced. Again, the restrictions on the values that the parameters can assume reflect 
the theoretical proposition that boomerang and overshoot do not occur.
Writing these equations in recursive form yields,
A HI At t t+ = +1 Ξ ,
where Ξ = 1 − H,
and
N I MNt t t+ = +1 Θ ,
where M = 1 − Θ.
The former has the feature of predicting that A, at any given time, is determined com-
pletely by the immediately preceding (temporally) linear combination of I and A. A 
exhibits positive first-order autoregression, but because the model posits multiple causes, 
it is not expected to exhibit perfect positive first-order autocorrelation. The same point 
applies to the latter; predicting N at any given time is determined completely by the 
immediately preceding (temporally) linear combination of I and N. Similar to A, N 
exhibits positive first-order autoregression, but because the model posits multiple causes, 
N is not expected to exhibit perfect positive first-order autocorrelation.
The recursive equations can be generalized and combined to produce the longitudi-
nal causal model presented in Figure 6. The change equations provide the theoretical 
(4)
(5)
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basis of this model; thus, Figure 6 follows logically from them. Measurements of A, N, 
I, and B taken at multiple times can be used to test this model, and by extension, the 
theory summarized in the change equations.
Because in the absence of a shock, such as a persuasive message, no reason to 
expect B to change exists; therefore, B is in equilibrium. The equilibrium prediction 
for I can be obtained by setting the change equation for I to zero and solving. This 
procedure yields the solution, B = I. Therefore, the model has the property that at equi-
librium, I and B become completely consistent. In addition, setting Equations 4 and 5 
to zero and solving yields the solutions, I = A and I = N. Therefore, at equilibrium, A 
and N become completely consistent with I.
A second simulation was conducted to examine the implications of the DRTRA for 
the fit of cross-sectional tests of the RTRA. In addition to examining the fit of the cross-
sectional RTRA at each time point, the time necessary to reach equilibrium was exam-
ined. As in the first simulation, the time taken to reach equilibrium was expected to 
decrease as the strength of the autoregression parameters increase relative to the strength 
of the cross-lag. To examine this notion, the autoregression parameters were varied.
Method
Seed distribution. The same initial distributions of each of the four key components of 
the DTRA simulation (A, N, I, and B) were used for the simulation of the DRTRA.
Design. Parameter values were assigned using the same procedures that were employed 
in the first simulation. These values are presented in Table 2.
Instrumentation. The same criteria employed in the first simulation for assessing equi-
libria were employed in this simulation as well. Similarly, the effect on the size and 
stability of the parameters, model fit, and the distributional properties of the variables 
that compose the model were assessed.
Results
Table 3 indicates that similar to the findings of the DTRA simulation, it took longer for 
distal endogenous variables, A and N, to reach equilibrium (M = 27 trials) than it did 
for the mediator, I (M = 18.34 trials). Also consistent with findings from the DTRA 
simulation, this difference was more pronounced when autoregression was strong (a 
difference of 15 trials) than when it was moderate (a difference of 7 trials) or weak (a 
difference of 4 trials).
Second, the effect of autoregression on trials to criterion was more pronounced for 
A and N than for I. Specifically, the difference between the moderate and weak autore-
gression conditions was 5 trials for I, but 8 trials for both A and N. The difference 
between the strong and moderate autoregression conditions was 15 trials for I, but 23 
trials for A and N.
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Third, the rapidity of the descent to equilibrium varied as a function of the strength 
of autoregression. Figure 7 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal 
places, in the change in I as a function of time. In all conditions, the standard deviation 
in the change in I decreased exponentially as a function of time. In addition, although 
the DRTRA with low autoregression parameters reached equilibrium faster than the 
DRTRA with high autoregression parameters, the latter never deviate substantially 
from equilibrium, and their deviations from equilibrium are smaller for most trials 
than are the deviations produced by the DRTRA with moderate or small autoregres-
sion parameters.
Figure 8 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal places, in the 
change in A as a function of trials. In all conditions, the standard deviation in the 
change in A decreased exponentially as a function of time. Again, although the model 
with low autoregression parameters reached equilibrium faster than the model with 
high autoregression parameters, the latter differ modestly from equilibrium at most 
time points. Moreover, at many time points, they deviate less from equilibrium than do 
the moderate or small autoregression parameters.
Figure 9 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal places, in the 
change in N as a function of time. As with A, in all conditions, the standard deviation 
in the change in N decreased exponentially as a function of time. Once again, the 
model with low autoregression parameters reached equilibrium faster than the model 
with high autoregression parameters. Nevertheless, the latter differ modestly from 
equilibrium at most time points. In addition, at many time points, they deviate less 
from equilibrium than do the moderate or small autoregression parameters.
Figure 7. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in I as a function of the time and 
the strength of autoregression for the Dynamic Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action (DRTRA).
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The features of the cross-sectional model examined included various descriptive 
statistics, parameter estimates, and measures of model fit. Each will be considered in 
turn.
As Table 4 indicates the values of the variances in I, A, and N at equilibrium varied 
little as a function of the strength of autoregression, stabilizing at .99 or 1. The number 
of trials required to reach these stable values did, however, vary substantially for the 
three variables and as a function of the strength of autoregression. Specifically, the 
variance in I stabilized more rapidly (M = 26 trials) than the variance in A or N (M = 
33.33 trials), trials to stabilize increased more than proportionally as the strength of 
autoregression increased (M = 13.33, 23.33, and 56 for weak, moderate, and strong 
autoregression, respectively), and the difference in trials to stabilize increased more 
rapidly for A and N than for I.
Data pertinent to the three parameters are presented in Table 5. The path linking B 
and I, p(IB) was obtained by regressing I on B, p(AI) by regressing A on I, and p(NI) 
by regressing N on I. From this table, one may observe that the path linking B and I 
(pIB), A and I (pAI), and N and I (pNI) all stabilized at 1.00. Notably, all parameters 
indicate that the endogenous variables are predicted without error to two decimal 
points when the model reaches an equilibrium state. Also notable is that the number of 
trials taken to reach stability increased with increasing autoregression for all pIB, pAI, 
and pNI estimates, albeit not proportionally. The same trend, taking longer for the distal 
endogenous variables to reach equilibrium, occurred. In the weak autoregression con-
dition, the pIB estimate stabilized after 5 trials, but it took both the pAI and pNI estimates 
8 trials. This difference increased as autoregression increased. For the moderate 
autoregression condition, the number of trials to reach equilibrium for the pIB estimate 
Figure 8. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in A as a function of the time and 
the strength of autoregression for the Dynamic Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action (DRTRA).
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was 8 trials, but it took the pAI and pNI 13 trials. Finally, for the strong autoregression 
condition, the number of trials to reach equilibrium for the pIB estimate was 21 trials, 
but it took pAI and pNI 33 trials.
Perfect fit of the cross-sectional model was again defined as occurring when the 
RMSE reduced to zero rounded to two decimal places. The number of trials to reach 
zero increased with increasing autoregression with 5 trials being required when autore-
gression was weak, 8 trials when autoregression was moderate, and 20 trials when 
autoregression was strong.
Discussion
Several of the patterns observed in the first simulation were observed in the simulation 
of the DRTRA. For example, the number of trials required for I, A, and N to stabilize 
increased more than proportionally with increasing autoregression. Moreover, more 
trials to stabilize were required for the distal endogenous variables, A and N, than for 
the more proximal endogenous variable, I. Comparatively, however, at all levels of 
autoregression more trials to stabilize were required for the one comparable parameter, 
I, in the DRTRA than the DTRA.
The DRTRA parameters stabilized at perfect prediction (i.e., r = 1.0) as would be 
expected when all endogenous variables posited to have a single cause (cf. rIB in the 
forward simulation). Once again, trials to reach perfect fit increased more than propor-
tionally as a function of increasing autoregression. Furthermore, across all levels of 
autoregression, more trials were required to reach perfect fit for the DRTRA than the 
DTRA.
Figure 9. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in N as a function of the time and 
the strength of autoregression for the Dynamic Reverse Theory of Reasoned Action (DRTRA).
720 Simulation & Gaming 45(6) 
If the DTRA modeled voluntary behavior effectively, and if the DRTRA modeled 
involuntary behavior effectively, the issue of how action that includes both voluntary 
and involuntary elements is to be modeled arises. One possibility is that a non-recur-
sive version of the TRA could be transformed into a Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory 
of Reasoned Action (DNTRA). This possibility is explored in a third simulation.
Non-Recursive Simulation
The longitudinal extension appears in Figure 10 and Figure 11. Incorporating elements 
of both the DTRA and the DRTRA, no variable is exogenous. Instead, I is driven by 
both A and N as in the DTRA, B is driven by I as in the DTRA, I is driven by B as in 
the DRTRA, and both A and N are driven by I as in the DRTRA.
The change in A is given by
 
∆A I A   = −( )ζ ,  (6)
so that at equilibrium A = I. In recursive form,
A I At t t+ = +1  ζ δ ,
where δ = 1 − ζ.
Similarly, the change in N can be expressed as,
 
∆N I N = ,ω −( )  (7)
so that at equilibrium N = I. In recursive form,
N I Nt t t+ = +1   ω ε ,
where ε = 1 − ω.
The change in B is given by,








Figure 10. The Non-Recursive Theory of Reasoned Action.
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and thus, at equilibrium B = I. In recursive form,
B I Bt t t+ = +1  ν ρ ,
where ρ = 1 − ν.
Finally, the change in intentions can be expressed as,
 ∆I A I N I B I= − + − + −τ µ ϕ( ) ( ) ( ).  (9)































where κ = 1-τ - µ − ϕ.
In recursive form,
I A N B It t t t t+ = + + +1     τ µ ϕ κ .
Method
Seed distribution. The same initial distributions of each of the four key components of 
the DTRA and DRTRA simulations (A, N, I, and B) were used for the simulation of the 
DNTRA.
Design. Parameter values were assigned using the same procedures that were employed 
in the first simulations. These values are presented in Table 2.
Instrumentation. The same criteria employed in the other simulations for assessing 
equilibria were employed in this simulation as well. Similarly, the effects on the size 
and stability of the parameters, model fit, and the distributional properties of the vari-
ables that compose the model were assessed.
Results
As Table 3 indicates, similar to the DTRA and DRTRA simulations, it took longer for 
the non-mediator variables, A, N, and B, to reach equilibrium (MA = 17, MN = 17.3, MB 
= 17 trials) than it did for the mediator, I (M = 6 trials). Also consistent with the other 
simulations, this difference was more pronounced when autoregression was strong (a 
difference of 17 for trials for B and I and A and I, and 18 trials for N and I) than when 
it was moderate (a difference of 9 trials in each case) or weak (a difference of 7 trials 
in each case).
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Second, the effect of autoregression on trials to criterion was more pronounced for 
A, N, and B than for I. Specifically, the difference between the moderate and weak 
autoregression conditions was 2 trials for I, but 4 trials for B, A, and N. Furthermore, 
the difference between the strong and moderate autoregression conditions was 5 trials 
for I, but 13 trials for B, 13 trials for A, and 14 trials for N.
Figure 12 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal places, in the 
change in A as a function of trials. In all conditions, the standard deviation in the 
change in A decreased exponentially as a function of time. As with the other simula-
tions, the descent for the low autoregression condition was steeper than the descent for 
the moderate autoregression condition than for the high autoregression condition. In 
addition, as with the other simulations, in the high autoregression condition, the depar-
ture from equilibrium was generally modest across trials.
Figure 13 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal places, in the 
change in N as a function of time. As with A, in all conditions, the standard deviation 
in the change in N decreased exponentially as a function of time. The same pattern of 
steepness of descent and departure from equilibrium was observed for these curves as 
with A.
Third, the rapidity of the descent of I to equilibrium varied as a function of the 
strength of autoregression. Figure 14 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five 
decimal places, in the change in I as a function of trials (time). In all conditions, the 
standard deviation in the change in I decreased exponentially as a function of time, and 
the same pattern of steepness of descent to equilibrium and departure from equilibrium 
was observed in these figures as was observed for A and N.
Figure 15 presents the standard deviation, calculated to five decimal places, in the 
change in B as a function of time. As with I, in all conditions, the standard deviation in 
the change in B decreased exponentially as a function of time. The same pattern of 
steepness of descent to equilibrium and departure from equilibrium was observed in 

















Figure 11. The longitudinal causal model produced by the Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory 
of Reasoned Action.
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Figure 12. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in A as a function of the 
time and the strength of autoregression for the DNTRA.
Note. DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of Reasoned Action.
Figure 13. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in N as a function of the 
time and the strength of autoregression for the DNTRA.
Note. DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of Reasoned Action.
724 Simulation & Gaming 45(6) 
The features of the cross-sectional model examined included various descriptive 
statistics, parameter estimates, and measures of model fit. Each will be considered in 
turn.
As Table 4 indicates the values of the variances in A, N, I, and B at equilibrium 
varied little as a function of the strength of autoregression, stabilizing in the mid .50 
range. The number of trials required to reach these stable values did, however, vary 
substantially for the four variables and as a function of the strength of autoregression. 
Specifically, the variance in I stabilized more rapidly (M = 6 trials) than the variance 
in A (M = 15.7 trials), N (M = 7.7 trials), and B (M = 15.3 trials), and trials to stabilize 
increased more than proportionally as the strength of autoregression increased (M = 
6.5, 7.5, and 19.5 for weak, moderate, and strong autoregression, respectively).
Data pertinent to the six parameters are presented in Table 5. From the simulation 
data, the parameters were estimated for the TRA parameters, and then were estimated 
from the RTRA parameters. Thus, non-recursive estimates were not employed; rather, 
the parameters treat the two cross-sectional models separately. One may observe that 
pIA and pIN stabilized at .50; whereas pBI, pIB, pAI, and pNI all stabilized at 1.00. Notably, 
the endogenous variables are predicted without error to two decimal points when the 
model reaches equilibrium. Also notable is that the number of trials taken to reach 
stability increased with increasing autoregression for all estimates, albeit not propor-
tionally. The same trend, taking longer for the non-mediator variables (A, N, and B) to 
reach equilibrium than the mediating variable (I), occurred. In the weak autoregression 
condition, the pIB estimate stabilized after 5 trials, but it took both the pAI and 
Figure 14. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in I as a function of the time 
and the strength of autoregression for the DNTRA.
Note. DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of Reasoned Action.
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pNI estimates 8 trials. This difference increased as autoregression increased. For the 
moderate autoregression condition, the number of trials to reach equilibrium for the 
pIB estimate was 8 trials, but it took the pAI and pNI 13 trials. Finally, for the strong 
autoregression condition, 21 trials were required to reach equilibrium for the pIB esti-
mate, but it took the pAI and pNI estimates 33 trials.
Perfect fit was again defined as the RMSE reducing to zero, rounded to two decimal 
places. The number of trials to reach zero increased with increasing autoregression. For 
the DTRA cross-sectional model, 3 trials were required when autoregression was weak, 
4 trials when autoregression was moderate, and 12 trials when autoregression was 
strong. The comparable figures for the DRTRA cross-sectional model were 3, 4, and 12.
Discussion
Several of the patterns observed in the first two simulations were observed in the simu-
lation of the DNTRA. Once again the number of trials required for I, A, N, and B to 
stabilize increased more than proportionally with increasing autoregression. Moreover, 
fewer trials to stabilize were required for the mediating variable, I, than for A, N, and 
B, all of which took the same number of trials to reach equilibrium. Comparatively, at 
all levels of autoregression, fewer trials were required for I to stabilize for the DNTRA 
than the DTRA and the DRTRA. Moreover, at all levels of autoregression, fewer trials 
were required for B to stabilize for the DNTRA than the DTRA, and fewer trials were 
required for A and N to stabilize for the DNTRA than the DRTRA.
Figure 15. The descent of the standard deviation in the change in B as a function of the 
time and the strength of autoregression for the DNTRA.
Note. DNTRA = Dynamic Non-Recursive Theory of Reasoned Action.
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The DNTRA parameters again stabilized when prediction was perfect. Once again, 
trials to reach perfect fit increased more than proportionally as a function of increasing 
autoregression. Furthermore, tests of cross-sectional models indicated that across all 
levels of autoregression, fewer trials were required to reach perfect fit for the DNTRA 
than the DTRA or the DRTRA.
General Discussion
We note several similarities across all longitudinal models. In each, strong autoregression 
parameters result in initially smaller departures from equilibrium than models with mod-
erate or weak autoregression, but they require more trials to reach perfect equilibrium 
than their moderate or weak autoregression counterparts. Moreover, in all cases, perfect 
fit of the cross-sectional model when the dynamic model is at equilibrium exists. Finally, 
the number of trials taken to reach equilibrium is less for proximal than distal effects.
We note several differences among the models as well. The DNTRA requires fewer 
trials to reach equilibrium than does the DTRA or the DRTRA. Furthermore, the 
DNTRA requires fewer trials for the cross-sectional models to reach perfect fit than 
does the DTRA or the DRTRA. Finally, the values of various parameters vary some-
what across the models and as a function of the various autoregression parameters.
The most striking implication for cross-sectional analysis is that the TRA fits per-
fectly at equilibrium, but may fail when the model is not in equilibrium. Notably, this 
outcome occurs even when the dynamic model fits perfectly, as it was designed to do 
in these simulations. Although in any research study, it would be difficult to ascertain 
the extent to which the system is in equilibrium for the sample employed, one can 
certainly generate reasonable hypotheses as to when it would be out of equilibrium. In 
particular, one would expect that an external shock to any of the four variables in the 
system, especially the exogenous variables, would jar the system out of equilibrium 
for a substantial number of participants. From the standpoint of social science scholar-
ship, the most interesting kind of shock would be a persuasive message(s) designed to 
change A or N (i.e., a persuasion experiment or a communication campaign) or a com-
pliance gaining technique designed to change B (i.e., a compliance gaining experi-
ment). So, for example, even when the dynamics of the DTRA are correct, if a 
communication campaign is effective or if a compliance gaining technique is effec-
tive, cross-sectional causal models may be found to be inconsistent with the data.
It is noteworthy that the DTRA, DRTRA, and DNTRA imply that in the absence of 
a shock the system comes to equilibrium. Conceivably, in the absence of a shock, per-
sons’ internal messages, or thoughts (note McGuire’s, 1960, notion of the Socratic 
effect and Hunter, Levine, & Sayers’s, 1976, concept of the internal message), coupled 
with their actions would produce this consistency among A, N, I, and B. Hence, these 
longitudinal models can be characterized as a kind of consistency model, and although 
it is not generally conceived in this manner, by extension, the cross-sectional models 
can be thought of as a kind of consistency model.
A more general theoretical claim can be made about dynamics as well. Lewis-
Beck’s (1974) analysis suggests that a correlation, or any associational statistic for that 
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matter, can be understood only in the context of embedding it in the correct causal 
model. Because the Lewis-Beck examples were cross-sectional, this conclusion may 
be misunderstood. Dynamic models treat all cross-sectional correlations as spurious, 
being driven by temporally prior common causes. Expanding then on Lewis-Beck’s 
claim, one might say that cross-sectional association can be understood only by 
embedding it in the correct longitudinal model.
This simulation was conducted under the assumption that the longitudinal model is 
correct to understand its implications. This assumption is unlikely to be met, as conceiv-
ably all theories are incorrect, if for no other reason than they are incomplete. Nevertheless, 
it provides a useful point to begin to think theoretically and longitudinally about model-
ing the relationships among cognitive processes, social processes, and action.
Appendix
TRA and RTRA Predictions
As indicated, if the TRA is correct, then the following two conditions hold:
r rAB AN =  +  ,αγ βγ( )
r rNB AN =  +  βγ αγ( ) .
Alternatively, three degrees of freedom associated with the reversed TRA (RTRA). 
Two of these degrees of freedom correspond to the same pair of unconstrained correla-
tions found in the TRA. Specifically, covariance algebra shows that the predicted val-
ues of these two correlations are
rAB  = ,αβ
rNB  = αγ.
The remaining degree of freedom corresponds to the fact that the RTRA makes an 
additional prediction about the value assumed by the A-N correlation or covariance. 
Using covariance algebra, it follows that the predicted correlation between these two 
variables is
r r rAN IA IN = .( )×( )
What is less well known is that the TRA and the RTRA make exactly the same 
predictions about the magnitude of the A-B and N-B correlations. Specifically, given 
Figure 5, the RTRA predicts that the A-B correlation is
∧rAB IB AI= r r .
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As mentioned previously, covariance algebra indicates that for the TRA, rAB = αγ + 
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which is the same prediction made by the RTRA. Following similar procedures, it can 
be demonstrated that the predicted N-B correlation is also equivalent for the TRA and 
RTRA.
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Notes
1. Several research groups have used simulations to explore various theoretical predictions of 
the TRA (e.g., Fife-Schaw, Sheeran, & Norman, 2007; Richetin et al., 2010). Such simula-
tions are helpful when investigators wish to explore the TRA in situations that would be 
difficult to measure with actual subjects. None of these investigators, however, have exam-
ined the models described here.
2. Although some scholars have collected longitudinal data to examine some of the relation-
ships in the cross-sectional model, they have relied on the traditional TRA model rather 
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than a model that explicitly models dynamic processes (Bamberg & Schmidt, 1998; Skår, 
Sniehotta, Araújo-Soares, & Molloy, 2008).
3. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) enumerate a number of antecedents of A and N, so that the 
longitudinal model could be expanded. To do so would make the model substantially more 
complex without a corresponding increase in theoretical benefit. Put another way, the same 
theoretical points emerge when initiating examination of the causal process at A and N, as 
they would if the causal process was expanded by considering their antecedents. Moreover, 
subsequently, Ajzen (1988, 2002) added a variable (perceived behavioral control or PBC), 
to his emended model, the Theory of Planned Behavior, and Ouellette and Wood (1998) 
suggest that the TRA would profit from adding the variable, habit. Dynamic versions of the 
TRA will indicate that PBC can be modeled profitably by changing the direction of causal-
ity, and that habit can be modeled profitably by certain autoregression parameters.
4. In the weak and moderate autoregression conditions, standard deviation curves were also 
examined with the number of trials taken to reach the equilibrium criterion extended to an 
equal number of trials required to reach this criterion for the strong autoregression condi-
tion. To do so, a very small number (.000001) was substituted for the standard deviation for 
these additional trials. The differences were trivial.
5. The model implies that mean attitude, subjective norm, behavioral intention, and behavior 
remain constant across trials. Moreover, because no antecedent(s) to attitude or subjective 
norm was included in this simulation, the variances of these variables remained constant 
(V = 1.00).
6. Skewness coefficients indicate that from unskewed seed distributions, the distributions 
first become skewed negatively and then become progressively more positively skewed 
over time, reaching an asymptote in the mid .6 to .7 range. Kurtosis coefficients indi-
cate that from relatively mesokurtic seed distributions, the distributions first become more 
platykurtic and then become increasingly leptokurtic over time, reaching an asymptote in 
the mid .3 to the mid .4 range. Notably, in all cases, variables whose initial distribution 
approximated closely the normal distribution depart substantially from normality as the 
model approaches equilibrium. Detailed figures for skewness and kurtosis for all simula-
tions may be obtained from the first author.
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